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‘Het recht moet nooit aan de politiek, de politiek daartegen
steeds aan het recht worden aangepast’
Immanuel Kant
‘The idea of law is nothing else but the idea of virtue
inserted in the political world.’
Tocqueville
Introduction
As almost ten years have passed since the establish-
ment of the International Tribunal for Violations of
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in May 1993, it
might be rather unpopular to dwell again upon cer-
tain issues which seem to have already been
answered and well established. But with the extra-
dition of Slobodan Milosevic, the former President
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the ICTY
and the beginning of the trial against him, it seems
that there is a renewed challenge for discussion. 
Milosevic was indicted by the Tribunal on 24 May
1999 (on the basis of Article 7 (1 & 3), of the ICTY
Statute, dealing with individual and superior crimi-
nal responsibility) for the crimes committed in the
territories of Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Ko-
sovo, while he was President of Yugoslavia respect-
ively Serbia. He is charged with 66 counts of Article
2 of the Statute (Grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions), Article 3 (Violations of the laws or
customs of war), Article 4 (Genocide and complicity
in genocide) and Article 5 (Crimes against hu-
manity).1 Milosevic was arrested by the Serbian spe-
cial police on 1 April 2001 and on 29 June 2001 he
was transferred to the ICTY prison in The Hague.
Even before his arrest Milosevic strongly opposed
the legality of the Tribunal by saying: ‘I have always
considered the international tribunal in The Hague
an illegal and immoral institution, invented as repris-
al for disobedient representatives and disobedient
people – as once there were concentration camps for
superfluous peoples and people.’2 During the Initial
Appearance he raised objections with regard to (a)
the legitimacy of the Tribunal; (b) his illegal arrest
which, as he claimed, took place in violation of all
the Yugoslav laws in force as well as of international
norms (the issue of habeas corpus); and (c) the lack of
the impartiality of the judges and of fair trial.3 The
Trial Chamber ruled and dismissed all the Motions.4
The trial of Milosevic started on 12 February 2002. 
This article intends to discuss some of the aspects of
a fair trial concept in the light of the above raised ob-
jections. The Milosevic Case is but one of the cases
pending before the Tribunal. As of October 2002,
out of 79 of the public list of indictees, 55 were in
proceedings and 24 remained at large.5 The Trial
against Milosevic is getting significant attention by
the public and media as he is seen as the main culprit
of the Yugoslav tragedy: with his nationalistic policy
and intention to create a ‘great Serbia’ whatever it
means, he tore Yugoslavia apart causing killings of
hundreds of thousands of people. However, the dis-
cussion on fair trial is not about him personally, nei-
ther about any of the 44 accused currently in custody
at the Detention Unit in The Hague, nor about the
15 of the accused who received their final sentence.
It is rather about the Tribunal itself and its contribu-
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tion to the development of the recent understanding
of a fair trial concept in international criminal law.
The concept of fair trial
It is indeed a well established rule of human rights
law that defendants in both civil and criminal proce-
dures should get a fair trial. Over the past forty years
this rule whose origins can be traced back in the
1215 Magna Carta6 and the 1791 USA Bill of
Rights, has been embodied in a number of import-
ant international human rights documents.7 In the
field of international humanitarian law and the law
on individual criminal responsibility fair trial has
been inserted in the two major post-Second World
War documents, the Nuremberg Charter of the
Military Tribunal8 and the Tokyo Charter of the In-
ternational Military Tribunal for the Far East9, as
well as in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 for
the protection of war victims10; and the two Addi-
tional Protocols of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions
of 194911. From the recent documents the right to
fair trial is embodied in Article 20 of the ICTY Stat-
ute, Article 19 of the 1994 International Criminal
Tribunal on Rwanda (ICTR) Statute and Article 64
of the International Criminal Court (ICC) Statute.
A basic function of fair trial provisions is ‘to protect
individuals from unlawful and arbitrary curtailment
or deprivation of other basic rights and freedoms, the
most prominent of which are the right to life and the
liberty of the person’.12 As it serves primarily as a
procedural safeguard in providing a due process, fair
trial has developed in a rather complex concept con-
sisting of a number of individual safeguards in differ-
ent i.e. pre-trial, trial and post-trial stages. Such are:
the prohibition of arbitrary arrest and detention; the
right to know the reasons for arrest, the right to legal
counsel, equal access to and equality before the
courts; the right to a fair hearing; the right to a public
hearing, the right to appeal and to compensation for
miscarriage of justice, etc.13 Most of the existing in-
ternational provisions are so formulated as to em-
brace in a more or less detailed manner all the el-
ements indispensable in a fair trial procedure.
Semantically the word fair means free from bias, dis-
honesty or injustice, proper under the rules.14 Syn-
onyms of the term are: unbiased, equitable, just, im-
partial, disinterested and unprejudiced.15 Trial is the
examination of facts and law presided over by a
judge (or other magistrate, such as a commissioner)
with authority to hear the matter (jurisdiction).16
Fair trial, thus, would mean unbiased, equitable, just,
impartial, disinterested and unprejudiced examina-
tion of facts and law presided over by a judge with
authority (jurisdiction) to hear the matter. It is there-
fore not by accident and without reason that some of
the major international human rights documents
such as the International Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights, the European Convention for Protec-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
and the American Convention on Human Rights,
make reference to a fair and public hearing by a com-
petent, independent and impartial tribunal previously17 es-
tablished by law,18 discussed in more details further on
in this article. Although it is remarkable that during
the preparatory stages of Article 14 of the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, no
6. Article 39 says: ‘No free man shall be ar-
rested or imprisoned or dispossessed or out-
lawed or in any way victimised [...] except by
the lawful judgement of his peers or judge-
ment of the law of the land.’
7. Of legally binding documents mentioning
deserve the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, the Convention against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and De-
grading Treatment or Punishment; the Afri-
can Charter on Human and People’s Rights;
the American Convention on Human
Rights; and the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms. In addition, some non-
legally binding documents also include fair
trial provisions like the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights; the American Declaration
of the Rights and Duties of Man; the Basic
Principles on the Independence of Judiciary;
the Principles on the Effective Prevention
and Investigation of Extra-legal, Arbitrary
and Summary Executions, etc.
8. Article 16.
9. Article 9.
10. Convention (I) for the Amelioration of
the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field (Article 49); Con-
vention (II) for the Amelioration of the Con-
dition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
Members of Armed Forces at Sea (Article
50); Convention (III) relative to the Treat-
ment of Prisoners of War (Article 103–106);
and, Convention (IV) relative to the Protec-
tion of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Ar-
ticle 5 (3)).
11. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Con-
ventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to
the Protection of Victims of International
Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) (Article 4) and
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conven-
tions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International
Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) (Article 2).
12. See, What is a Fair Trial? A Basic Guide to
Legal Standards and Practice, prepared by the
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights.
13. Ibid.
14. Jess Stein (Ed.-in-Ch.), The Random
House Dictionary of the English Language, New
York: Random House 1983, p. 511.
15. Ibid.
16. Real Life Dictionary of the Law, 
<http://dictionary.law.com>.
17. Some international provisions, like the
American Convention on Human Rights
(Article 8), contain the word previously,
whereas the others do not include this word
thereby excluding any discussion of its exact
meaning and implementation in practice. 
18. See, Article 14 of the ICCPR (which is
the most prominent fair trial provision of the
Covenant and it incorporates the content of
Articles 10 and 11 (1) of the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights, Article 6 of the
European Convention on Human Rights
and Article 8 of the American Convention. 
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significant discussion has taken place regarding this
particular provision,19 it is indisputable that the re-
quirement of independence and impartiality, but also
of the establishment of a tribunal by law, lie in the
very foundation of a fair trial. For example, it is
strongly claimed that the concept of fair trial cannot
be de-linked from the basic principle of rule of law
for which there is no place in the states governed by
military rule. Being dictatorial and oppressive, mili-
tary regimes are opposed to the principles of justice,
human rights protection and fairness. For this reason,
it has been claimed, in the countries with military
rule it is not possible to have fair trials, as well.20
Similarly, it has also been considered that military
courts, special tribunals, or courts which include
military officers in panels of judges, undermine the
independence of judiciary which is one of the basic
premises of fair trial.21 Therefore, it would be safe to
say that the concept of fair trial is much broader and
is not limited only to procedural safeguards, mostly
dealt with and discussed in the recent publications.
Its proper implementation requires the consideration
of the basic preconditions which are: a tribunal to be
‘established by law’, to be independent and to be im-
partial.
The establishment of the ICTY and fair trial
It was, in fact, the manner in which the ICTY was
established by the UN Security Council as an ad hoc
tribunal which gave rise to a broad discussion in
academic circles as to its impartiality and indepen-
dence. In this sense, Milosevic was not the first de-
fendant to object the legality of the Tribunal. He
claimed that all international and national docu-
ments, and rules and regulations, determine the fact
that a court can be there to judge only if it has been
established on the basis of law. Therefore, he asserted
that the Security Council could not transfer to the
Tribunal the right that it itself does not have and so
the Tribunal has no competence to try.22 It was
Dusko Tadic who raised the issue of the legality of
the Tribunal.23 He was the first person indicted and
taken into the ICTY custody and charged with vi-
olations of international humanitarian law, grave
breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention and
crimes against humanity. His objections might be
‘subsumed under one general heading: that the ac-
tion of the Security Council in establishing the In-
ternational Tribunal and in adopting the statute
under which it functions is beyond the power, hence
the International Tribunal is not duly established by
law and cannot try the accused.’24 To be duly estab-
lished by law, the ICTY should have been created
either by treaty which is the consensual act of
nations, or by amendment of the UN Charter.25
The ICTY was established by a UN Security Coun-
cil resolution 827 (1993) of 25 May 1993 ‘for the
sole purpose of prosecuting persons responsible for
serious violations of international humanitarian law
committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia
between 1 January and a later date to be determined
by the Security Council’.26 It is quite clear that the
Security Council, which has a primary responsibility
for the maintenance of peace and security,27 acting
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, established
the Tribunal as a security i.e. enforcement measure.
As pointed out in resolution 827 (1993), the Council
was convinced that in the particular circumstances of
the former Yugoslavia the establishment of an inter-
national tribunal as an ad hoc measure would contrib-
ute to the restoration and maintenance of peace and
to ensuring that such violations are halted and effec-
tively redressed.28 In the words of the former UN
Secretary-General, Boutros-Boutros Ghali, ‘in ask-
ing the Secretary-General to consider [the project of
establishing of the Tribunal], the Security Council
has given itself an entirely new mandate.’29 The Se-
curity Council was aware that the procedure of es-
tablishing the Tribunal was unusual. The UN Sec-
retary General pointed out that in ‘the normal course
of events’ a tribunal would be established by the
conclusion of a treaty previously drawn up and ap-
proved by an international body, e.g. the General
Assembly or by a specially convened conference,30
like it was done by the adoption of the Rome Statute
establishing the ICC later on, in 1998. Such an ap-
proach would allow a detailed examination and elab-
oration of all the issues relevant for the establishment
of the international tribunal. At the same time it
19. See, for example, Travaux Préperatoires
of Article 14 of the ICCPR for which almost
no discussion took place with regard to the
particular provision referring to independent
and impartial tribunal established by law. In
David Weissbrodt, The Right to a Fair Trial,
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (2001), p. 51–
52.
20. An Asian Seminar on Fair Trial held in
Hong Kong on 7–12 November 1999
<http://cambodia.ahrchk.net/mainfile.php/
19 991 107/>.
21. Note, for example, the comments of
Amnesty International concerning the anti-
terrorism law of Pakistan, enacted in August
1997, providing, inter alia, for special anti-
terrorism courts (AI Index: ASA 33/004/
2002).
22. Transcript of 13 February 2002, p. 217
(11–21). 
23. Prosecution v. Dusko Tadic A/K/A ‘Dule’,
Case No. IT-94-I-T.
24. Prosecution v. Dusko Tadic A/K/A
‘Dule’, Decision on the Defence Motion on
Jurisdiction, 10 August 1995, para. 1.
25. Idem., para. 2.
26. UN Security Council Resolution 827
(1993) of 25 May 1993, para. 2.
27. Article 24 (1) of the UN Charter. 
28. Preamble of the UN Security Council
Resolution 827 (1993) of 25 May 1993.
29. Quoted from Srdja Trifkovic, The Hague
‘Tribunal’: Bad Justice, Worse Politics, Keynote
Speech at the S.B.A. Annual Scholarship Ball
Union League Club, Chicago, 7 June 1996.
30. Report of the UN Secretary General
pursuant to paragraph 2 of the Security
Council resolution 808 (1993) presented on
3 May 1993, (UN Doc. S/25 704), para. 19.
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would allow the full exercise of the sovereign will of
the states in the process of negotiation of the treaty,
as well as in the process of their decision-making to
become parties to the treaty or not.31 However, this
would require a too time-consuming procedure not
allowed by the urgency of the situation existing in
the former Yugoslavia at that time.32 The urgency of
the matter did also not allow the General Assembly
to deal with the procedure of the adoption of the
Statute.33 Instead, as pointed out above, the Security
Council proceeded by the adoption of a resolution
based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In
establishing the Tribunal it relied on its capacity to
create a subsidiary body under Article 29 of the UN
Charter.34
Though a majority of the authors agree that the ad-
vantage of a thus established tribunal is in avoiding
long treaty negotiations, they do not deny the prob-
lems in acknowledging a clear legal ground for its
creation. ‘It is particularly uncertain from where the
Security Council derives the competence to submit
acts committed on a state’s territory and within its
jurisdictional power to an international criminal
court without asking this state to accept this submis-
sion by way of a formal act of cession or transfer.’35
Notwithstanding the fact that there is a broad legal
framework for the Security Council’s measures and
activities in the field of peace and security as estab-
lished by Article 24(2) of the UN Charter, there is
no explicit or implicit provision on the particular ca-
pacities of the Security Council to establish any kind
of a judicial body. However, it has been claimed that
Article 39 of the UN Charter by giving the compe-
tence to the Security Council to determine whether
a situation of an ‘internal armed conflict’ presents a
threat to peace and security, provides the Security
Council with further capacities in determining
which measures of non-military and military nature
can be decided upon in response to such a situation.
In this sense, as it was pointed out by the ICTY Ap-
peals Chamber, the establishment of the Tribunal
presents a ‘measure not involving the use of force’
pursuant to Article 41 of the UN Charter, and does
not constitute an improper delegation neither usur-
pation of judicial powers.36 The Charter leaves the
scope of Article 41 open and thus a relatively broad
discretion to the Security Council to decide upon a
type of a non-military measure.
It is a matter of fact that, apart from some cases of de-
fence motions challenging the jurisdiction of the
ICTY, the issue of the capacity of the Security
Council to establish the ICTY (and also ICTR), is
only an academic question as there is no established
procedure in determining the validity of acts of the
United Nations organs. In the past the International
Court of Justice refused to avail itself with judicial
review or appeal in respect of the decisions taken by
the United Nations organs.37 Similarly, the ICTY
Trial Chamber also refused to deal with the issues
scrutinizing the actions of the UN organs which
would be a task of a constitutional court set up for
that purpose.38 Although, interestingly enough, in
the view of the Appeals Chamber the International
Tribunal is empowered to pronounce itself upon the
plea challenging the legality of its establishment and
it did so in the Tadic Case.39 Even more interesting is
the fact that the The Hague District Court pro-
nounced its view in the summary civil proceedings
in the case Slobodan Milosevic v. The State of the Neth-
erlands.40  
The meaning of the notion ‘established by law’
A strict interpretation of the wording of the existing
international legal provisions on fair trial raises the
crucial question of whether the adoption of Resolu-
tion 827 (1993) can be taken to mean that the Tri-
bunal was ‘established by law’. Regarding this, the
ICTY Appeals Chamber has extensively elaborated
its view in the above-mentioned Tadic Case.41 Ac-
cording to the Appeals Chamber there are three
possible interpretations of the term established by law:
firstly, it means established by legislature in a deci-
sion-making process under democratic control. This
manner ensures that the administration of justice is
31. Ibid.
32. See the Preamble of the Security Coun-
cil resolution 808 (1993) of 22 February
1993.
33. Idem, para. 21.
34. Interestingly enough, the Security
Council did not follow the same ‘formula’
regarding the establishment of the Special
Court for Sierra Leone. Instead, on 16 Janua-
ry 2002, an agreement was concluded bet-
ween the United Nations and the Govern-
ment of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of
a Special Court, by which the Government
of Sierra Leone, exercising its sovereign
right, gave its consent and full support to its
creation. 
35. Kai Ambos, ‘Establishing an Internation-
al Criminal Court and an International
Criminal Code – Observations from an
International Criminal Law Viewpoint’, Vol.
7 European Journal of International Law (1996)
No. 4, p. 519–544, at n. 17. 
36. Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic A/K/A ‘Dule’,
Decision on the Defence Motion for Inter-
locutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October
1995, para. 38.
37. See, the Advisory Opinions of the Inter-
national Court of Justice in Certain Expenses
of the United Nations (20 July 1962) and in
Legal Consequences for States of the continued
Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South-West
Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolu-
tion 276 (21 June 1971).
38. Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic A/K/A ‘Dule’,
Decision on the Defence Motion on Juris-
diction, of 10 August 1995.
39. Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic A/K/A ‘Dule’,
Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlo-
cutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October
1995.
40. Ruling of the District Court of The
Hague of 31 August 2001, Case No. KG 01/
975.
41. Idem, paras. 41–47.
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not a matter of executive discretion, but is regulated
by laws made by the legislature. However, this can-
not find its application on the international level,
since the constitutional structure of the United
Nations organs does not exist and cannot be com-
pared with the division of powers in the municipal
systems on legislative, executive and judicial func-
tions. Secondly, it refers to the establishment of inter-
national courts by a body which, though not a Par-
liament, has a limited power to take binding deci-
sions, such as the Security Council has under Chap-
ter VII. Thirdly, that its establishment must be in
accordance with the rule of law. In the case of the
ICTY it means that it had to be established in
accordance with the proper international standards
and it must provide all guarantees of fairness, justice
and even-handedness, ‘in full conformity with inter-
nationally recognized human rights standards.42
In addition, the Appeals Chamber pointed out that
‘in determining whether a tribunal has been ‘established by
law’ is not whether it was pre-established or established for
a specific purpose or situation; what is important is that it
be set up by a competent organ in keeping with the relevant
legal procedures, and that it observes the requirements of
procedural fairness.’43
The requirements laid down in Article 14(1) of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, Article 6(1) of the European Convention on
Human Rights and Article 8(1) of the American
Convention on Human Rights, impose ‘an interna-
tional obligation which only applies to the adminis-
tration of criminal justice in a municipal setting’.44
However, the Appeals Chamber stressed, an interna-
tional court could not be set up at the mere whim of
a group of governments, but such a court ought to
be rooted in the rule of law and offer all guarantees
embodied in the relevant international instruments,
in which case it can be said that the court was ‘estab-
lished by law’.45
This is rather an interesting view. It is, of course, true
that there are substantial differences between nation-
al and international systems which only allow a lim-
ited comparison. Instead of legislative procedures
typical for national systems, on international level
states have developed special procedures in adopting
legal rules large part of which consists of negotiation
and deliberation in decision-making. One of the
main intentions of these procedures is to safeguard
the principle of state sovereignty which is the reason
why the international legal system is still rather a
horizontal than a vertical system of law. Apart from
this, the majority of the existing international organ-
izations, including the United Nations, have Assem-
blies or Parliaments as bodies representative of the
interests of the ‘governed’. In addition, various inter-
national organs not composed of representatives of
all member states possess those functions which states
have as part of their sovereignty transferred to them.
This is how, with some exceptions,46 the powers of
the Security Council have been established. It has
been afforded by a real treaty, the UN Charter, a
broad discretion to pass autonomous decisions in the
field of peace and security which are legally binding
on states on the basis of Articles 2547 and 10348. Its
powers under Chapter VII are
‘coercive vis-à-vis the culprit state or entity [and ...] are
also mandatory vis-à-vis the other UN member states who
are under the obligation to cooperate with the Organization
[...] and with one another [...] in the implementation of
the action or measures decided by the Security Council.’49
For this reason one would be inclined to consider
resolutions of the Security Council adopted under
Chapter VII rather as ‘executive orders’ as it was
claimed by the Defence in the Tadic Case, or in any
case, as ‘binding measures’ adopted for particular
situations and providing for actions and procedures
intended as a means to an end. This was, by the way,
confirmed by the Hague District Court in whose
view ‘an international organization such as the UN
[...] is perfectly entitled to establish a tribunal by way
of a measure’ (curs. aut.).50 In this sense the term
‘measures’ as used in Articles 41 and 42 of the UN
Charter reflects the ad hoc nature of the decisions of
the Security Council. It can also help in explaining
why the Security Council adopted a resolution on an
ad hoc tribunal and was not capable of establishing a
permanent criminal court. In this light should also be
seen the ICTY Statute which is ‘neither common
42. Idem, paras. 43–45.
43. Idem, para. 45.
44. Idem, para. 42.
45. Ibid.
46. The exception refers to the position of
Permanent members of the Security Council
which was not negotiable during the confer-
ence in San Francisco in 1945, but was mere-
ly accepted by original member states.
47. Article 25: ‘The Members of the United
Nations agree to accept and carry out the de-
cisions of the Security Council in accordance
with the present Charter’. 
48. Article 103: ‘In the event of a conflict
between the obligations of the Members of
the United Nations under the present Char-
ter and their obligations under any other in-
ternational agreement, their obligations
under the present Charter shall prevail.’ 
49. Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic  A/K/A ‘Dule’,
Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlo-
cutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October
1995, para. 31. 
50. Ruling of the District Court of The
Hague of 31 August 2001, Case No. KG 01/
975.
8 RM THEMIS 2003/1
D R .  S N E Z A N A  T R I F U N O V S K A
law accusatorial nor civil law inquisitorial, nor even
an amalgam of both: it is sui generis’.51 
And, of course, nobody claims that the establish-
ment of the Tribunal was anything else but a security
i.e. enforcement measure of the Security Council.
However, it seems difficult to reconcile the idea and
the function of an enforcement measure with the
concept of established by law. It is really true that, un-
like the Covenant of the League of Nations which in
Article 16 listed the possible measures not-involving
military force taken by the member states which
were limited to the breaking of trade and financial
relations, the Security Council has on its disposal an
open-ended list of measures upon which it can de-
cide. In practice this led to the implementation of a
comprehensive set of coercive measures which, in
addition to the measures of economic nature and
arms embargo, included also freezing of financial as-
sets abroad, prohibition of the participation in sport-
ing and cultural events, etc. As a matter of principle
there is no reason why the creation of a tribunal by
the Security Council would not be considered as
such a possible measure. Probably the most import-
ant objection which can be raised in this regard is
that by this measure the Security Council proceeded
with the establishment of a body which is supposed
to be its subsidiary body, thus to carry out certain of
its own functions afforded to it by the UN Charter.
More concretely, in this case the Security Council
empowered a subsidiary body, the Tribunal, with ju-
dicial functions which it itself does not possess. Some
critics point out that
‘it would take a very flexible legal mind indeed, to interpret
[Chapter VII of the UN Charter] as carte blanche to inves-
tigate people, indict them, try them, find them guilty and
keep them in prison.’52
However, the strict meaning of Article 29 (‘The Se-
curity Council may establish such subsidiary organs
as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions’
(curs. aut.)), does not imply such an understanding.
This provision gives a large degree of discretion to
the Security Council to establish a body which is in
its own view necessary for the performance of its
functions, and that is for the maintenance of peace
and security. It means that it is up to the Security
Council to freely assess whether a measure such as
the establishment of a tribunal would be an adequate
response to a certain security situation. The same
competence with the same wording is given to the
General Assembly in Article 22, and there is also a
more general provision in Article 7(2) of the UN
Charter, which is of relevance for all principal organs
of the United Nations that ‘[s]uch subsidiary organs
as may be found necessary may be established in ac-
cordance with the [...] Charter’. Quite certainly the
drafters of the UN Charter at the time of drafting the
Charter did not envisage the establishment of the
Tribunal as a subsidiary organ, but there is an obvi-
ous intention reflected in the wording to give such a
broad scope to the provisions on subsidiary bodies to
be able to accommodate various needs which would
come up in the future. However, despite the claim
of the Tribunal and of those who participated in its
creation, there is also an obvious and embodied con-
tradiction and incompatibility between the notions
of an independent court of law and of a subsidiary organ
established to fulfil certain duties, in this case for the
performance of [the Security Council] functions. This in-
compatibility comes from the fact that while carry-
ing out its functions as a judicial body, the Tribunal
needs to take into consideration the existing political
goals of the Security Council in the fulfilment of its
duty as a subsidiary organ. This very fact undermines
the principle of judicial independence.53
Legality v. legitimacy
In the light of serious critics regarding the legal
grounds giving the Security Council the capacity to
establish the Tribunal(s), one can wonder how it is
possible that there is a substantial international sup-
port for the decision itself. It seems that the decision
draws its strength from the legitimacy afforded to the
Security Council rather than from its strict legality:
the goal(s) to be achieved justify the means used.54
The establishment of the ICTY has been seen as le-
gitimate primarily because of the highly moral quest
to react to the security situation in the former Yugo-
slavia. It coincides with the claim that the interpreta-
tion or application of a law is always open to the ar-
gument that it should be interpreted and applied in a
way that is morally defensible and if necessary should
be amended in a way that it becomes morally defen-
sible.55 
51. Patrick L. Robinson, ‘Ensuring Fair and
Expeditious Trials at the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugosla-
via’, Vol. 11 European Journal of International
Law No. 3 (2000), p. 569–589, at p. 569. 
52. Srdja Trifkovic, The Hague ‘Tribunal’:
Bad Justice, Worse Politics, Keynote Speech at
the S.B.A. Annual Scholarship Ball Union
League Club, Chicago, 7 June 1996. 
53. See on the impact of political considera-
tions on judicial independence in: J. Clifford
Wallace, ‘An Essay on Independence of the
Judiciary: Independence from What and
Why’, Vol. 58 NYU Annual Survey of Ameri-
can Law (2001), p. 214–258.
54. The Appeals Chamber pointed out in
the Tadic Case that the establishment of the
Tribunal lies in the wide discretion of the Se-
curity Council as to chosen means, and
should not be tested by the likelihood of suc-
cess or failure in achieving the Council’s
goals. Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic A/K/A ‘Du-
le’, Decision on the Defence Motion for In-
terlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 Octo-
ber 1995, para. 39.
55. Tony Honoré, The Necessary Connection
between Law and Morality, <www.users.
ox.ac.uk/~alls0079/positivism2.pdf>.
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According to some sources legitimacy is taken to
mean: according to law; lawful; in accordance with
established rules, principles or standards; in accord-
ance with the laws of reasoning; to make lawful or
legal; pronounce or state as lawful. Its synonyms are:
legal; licit; sanctioned; valid.56 However, it cannot
be equated with legality. Prominent philosophers
such as Max Weber, do not consider legitimacy as a
normative concept. In the Weber’s view legitimacy
is ‘empirical belief of a specific populace in the norma-
tive legitimacy of a given political order’ (curs.
aut.).57 It comes from the combined force of two
processes which need to occur together: open delib-
eration in and around the institution and the effec-
tiveness of the institution in meeting its goals.58 As
part of the process, deliberation is important because
it increases the amount of information available in
the decision. At the same time, the effectiveness in
achieving the goals will increase legitimacy. During
the Cold War period the Security Council failed to
legitimise itself because it was able to take decisions
only infrequently, and often even when it managed
to issue substantive resolutions these were ignored by
significant states in the international system.59 
Another approach to the legitimacy comes from law,
meaning that the law (or the state) is the ultimate de-
cider of morality and so of legitimacy60: the estab-
lished law should be the starting point in establishing
the legitimacy and not the other way around. Ac-
cordingly, legitimacy comes only as a strengthening
factor of well-based legal decisions. However in
practice it might not be the case: while an action or
decision can lack legality it can be perceived as legit-
imate. It is how, for example the NATO military in-
tervention in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
i.e. Kosovo, is being seen. In certain compelling
cases such as the NATO intervention, the illegality
will not threaten the action’s legitimacy under the
condition that this occurs as an exception to the well
established rule of legality. ‘For international politics,
the Kosovo case (assuming we see it as legitimate)
shows that sometimes moral imperative can trump
legal rightness in underwriting legitimacy, but with
dangers for the future.’61
Similarly, the establishment of the ICTY should be
seen as result of the legitimacy of the Security Coun-
cil to take action and the moral quest to do so, taken
to substitute the weak legal ground. However,
whereas this presents only an attempt to find justifi-
cation(s) and explanations, it is a matter of fact that in
the study of international relations little attention has
been paid to the issue of how legitimacy affects inter-
national organizations and their acceptance by na-
tion-states62 and, for the purpose of this discussion,
also the existing international law. It is only lately
that the issue of legitimacy of international organ-
izations and bodies (including the UN Security
Council) receives certain attention and is the subject
of discussion also. This is certainly the result of the
changed conditions and the Security Council’s in-
tensified activity and decision-making in the post-
Cold War period.
Independence and impartiality of the ICTY
On two occasions, in both cases unsuccessfully, Mi-
losevic sought legal remedies outside the ICTY
claiming, inter alia, the lack of independence and im-
partiality of the Tribunal. In his submissions before
the Hague District Court initiating summary civil
proceedings, he claimed that the ICTY could not be
regarded as independent and impartial Tribunal
within the meaning of Article 6 of the European
Convention on Human Rights as it maintains close
and friendly relations with NATO and is indeed de-
pendent on NATO.63 The District Court dismissed
the contention without entering any substantial ar-
gumentation. It made only a brief reference to the
numerous regulations, including lengthy and de-
tailed rules for the protection of the rights of the ac-
cused which present constraints to the Tribunal’s ac-
tions. In addition, it noted that according to the
Ruling of the European Court of Human Rights in
the Naletilic v. Croatia Case, the ICTY fulfils all the
criteria necessary for the protection of the accused,
including those of impartiality and independence.64 
Similar claim was raised by Milosevic in his applica-
tion lodged to the European Court of Human
Rights now against the decision of the Hague Dis-
trict Court.65 He complained, inter alia, that under
Article 6 of the European Convention of Human
Rights the ICTY’s procedure was not ‘fair’. Article
6 (1) was violated by the failure of the ICTY’s Pros-
ecutor to prosecute those responsible for the afore-
56. Jess Stein (Ed.-in-Ch.), The Random
House Dictionary of the English Language, New
York: Random House 1983, p. 819.
57. Max Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft,
Tübingen (1980/1998), at 122, quoted from
Winfried Thaa, Legitimacy in the Context of In-
ternationalized Decision-Making Through Inter-
national Organizations, paper presented at the
Conference Democracy and Legitimacy of
the European Union and Other International
Organizations, held at the European Parlia-
ment, Brussels, 11–12 October 2002. 
58. Ian Hurd, Legitimacy and the United Na-
tions: Deliberation and Effectiveness in the Securi-
ty Council, paper presented at the Conference
Democracy and Legitimacy of the European
Union and Other International Organiza-
tions, held at the European Parliament, Brus-





63. Slobodan Milosevic v. The State of The
Netherlands, Case No. KG 01/975.
64. Idem, para. 3.4. 
65. Application No. 77 631/01 by Slobodan
Milosevic against The Netherlands. 
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mentioned military intervention by NATO member
states. He also claimed that the ICTY united in a
single organ administrative, legislative and judicial
functions ‘since it had the power to amend its own
rules and delegated powers to its Registrar.’66 ‘[T]he
aggregate of these failings alleged prevented any trial
before the ICTY from ever being ‘fair’.’67 In addi-
tion, the ICTY’s Statute provided for ‘persons re-
sponsible’ or ‘persons presumed responsible’ for
specified crimes, which violated Article 6 (2) of the
European Convention as it reflected a presumption
of guilt even before the start of every trial. Apart
from violations of Article 6, Milosevic complained
under Article 10 of the European Convention re-
garding the restrictions imposed on him to have con-
tacts with the press and media; under Article 13
complaining that it was the ICTY which offered the
only ‘remedy’ available against the violations he al-
leged; and also under Article 14 which is a general
provision prohibiting discrimination.68 However,
none of the allegations were actually dealt with by
the European Court, as the Application was declared
inadmissible on the basis of the non-exhaustion of
domestic remedies.69 
The issue of impartiality and independence of the
ICTY is one of the major points of interest which
receives significant public attention. Many of those
who are proponents of the Tribunal and those who
are its opponents carefully follow its work in the
courtroom and its activities outside it. Formally
speaking there are safeguards embodied in the ICTY
Statute. It contains provisions on impartiality and in-
dependence of permanent and ad litem judges and of
the Prosecutor (Articles 12, 13 and 16). The judges
of the ICTY should be persons of high moral char-
acter, impartiality and integrity. Impartiality in this
context includes impartiality with respect to the acts
falling within the competence of the Tribunal.70 At
the same time, as a separate organ of the ICTY, the
Prosecutor also acts independently without seeking
or receiving instructions from any government or
from any other source. 
In the implementation of the ICTY Statute and the
Rules of Procedure and Evidence the Tribunal uses
the appropriate interpretative technique which gives
the weight to the principles embodied in Article 31
(1) of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Trea-
ties.71 In certain situations, however, the flexibility
revealed by the Tribunal might invoke questions of
procedural fairness. As it is not the purpose of this ar-
ticle to discuss in detail the elements of due process
as implemented in the practice of the Tribunal, it
suffices to say that there are in this respect some in-
stances of concern. As such can be mentioned the
permission of secret testimonies and anonymous wit-
nesses which takes away the possibility for the ac-
cused to counter false accusations, or allowing a con-
viction by a Trial Chamber for a crime not listed in
the indictment, which is prejudicial to the defence
because it leaves them without opportunity to pre-
pare counter evidence.72
However, apart from this, there is still an open ques-
tion as to the impact which the manner of the estab-
lishment of the Tribunal and its position as a subsid-
iary organ of the Security Council has on the Tribu-
nal’s independence and impartiality. This issue stands
independently from the political motives of the Se-
curity Council in establishing a tribunal only for Yu-
goslavia (and later on, for Rwanda) and not reacting
in the same way in some equally or even more com-
pelling cases which occurred in the past, such as the
killing of two million people or one third of Cambo-
dia’s population by Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge in the
period 1975–1978 or the killing of half a million
people by the Indonesian Army in 1965–1966. 
In his Report of May 1993 the UN Secretary Gen-
eral pointed out that the Tribunal, as a subsidiary or-
gan of the Security Council of a judicial nature and
established under Chapter VII of the UN Charter 
‘would, of course, have to perform its functions independ-
ently of political considerations; it would not be subject
to the authority or control of the Security Council with re-
gard to the performance of its judicial functions (rom.
aut.).’73
At the same time, the Secretary General added:
‘as an enforcement measure under Chapter VII, however,
the life span of the international tribunal would be linked
to the restoration and maintenance of international
peace and security in the territory of the former Yugosla-






70. Report of the Secretary-General
pursuant to Paragraph 2 of the Security
Council Resolution 808 (1993), UN Doc.
S/25 704 of 3 May 1993, para. 74.
71. Patrick L. Robinson, ‘Ensuring Fair and
Expeditious Trials at the International Cri-
minal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’,
Vol. 11 European Journal of International Law
No. 3 (2000), p. 569–589, at p. 569.
72. Sara Stepelton, ‘Ensuring a Fair Trial in
the International Criminal Court: Statutory
Interpretation and the Impermissibility of
Derogation’, Vol. 31 International Law and
Politics (1999), p. 535–609; at p. 557–558.
73. Report of the Secretary-General
pursuant to Paragraph 2 of the Security
Council Resolution 808 (1993), UN Doc.
S/25 704 of 3 May 1993, para. 28.
74. Ibid. 
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There is a simple logic needed to understand that the
Tribunal as such, having a substantial function in the
restoration and maintenance of peace and security,
contains a structural difficulty in separating political
i.e. security aspects from its judicial functions. Vari-
ous examples illustrate, indeed, that certain activities
of the Tribunal were directly linked to the political
considerations and that some countries see it as a use-
ful foreign policy tool.75
‘The experience with the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda
proved that an international indictment and arrest warrant
could serve to isolate offending leaders diplomatically,
strengthen the hand of domestic rivals, and fortify the inter-
national political will to impose economic sanctions and take
more aggressive actions if necessary’76
One would expect that, if it was not for political mo-
tives, Milosevic would have been indicted much
earlier for his alleged involvement in the crimes
committed in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina,
and would have not been accepted as one of the
main signatories of the Dayton Peace Accord in
1995 and a guarantor of its implementation. Similar-
ly, the indictment against him came in a moment de-
termined by political considerations in the midst of
the NATO military intervention in Yugoslavia.
There is an overall impression that the indictment
had a ‘political function’ which, in some views,
sought to ‘buttress support in the US and Europe for
NATO’s war, while whipping into line those
NATO countries – such as Germany and Italy – that
have resisted the push by Britain and the US for a
ground invasion.77 There have been also strong
voices that for political reasons ICTY has not pro-
vided any satisfactory responses to the claims that
some of the NATO leaders by ordering the military
intervention in Yugoslavia should have been indict-
ed for ‘crimes against peace, crimes against humanity
and war crimes’.78 By doing so, the ICTY and its
Prosecutor took a risk of being blamed for applica-
tion of ‘selective justice’ and the violation of the
rules of independence and impartiality.
As the time passes, there is a growing number of in-
ternational lawyers, and civil and human rights acti-
vists and groups, which have raised their concerns at
the ICTY’s lack of genuine impartiality and its rou-
tine violation of basic standards of jurisprudence.79
Ordinary people are the strongest proponents of
punishing individuals for crimes committed against
the innocent. Yet very few of the general public be-
lieve that Milosevic will get a fair trial.80 Too many
various elements and events seem to have already af-
fected the Tribunal’s impartiality and independence.
For example, the media coverage throughout the
whole period of the conflict in the former Yugosla-
via and the statements of the Western leaders ex-
pressing their satisfaction with Milosevic’s detention
have already influenced public opinion. This makes
it very difficult for the Tribunal to ignore the exist-
ing public feelings so-created. It brings into question
the application of the right of the accused to be pre-
sumed innocent until proved guilty (Article 21 of the
ICTY Statute). In addition, as pointed out, the in-
dictment itself was not a serious legal document sup-
ported by probative evidence and had a strongly
biased character as much of the evidence was sup-
plied by two countries, the USA and Great Britain,
that were waging war against Serbia at the time of
indictment.81 
The financing of the Tribunal is also seen as an ob-
stacle to achieving of a genuine impartiality and
independence. Though according to Article 32 of
the ICTY Statute, the expenses of the Tribunal
should be borne by the regular budget of the United
Nations, some sources indicate that it has been the
recipient of corporate patronage and routinely works
in tandem with the departments overseeing US for-
eign policy, 82 though Islamic donors are also prom-
inent. In 1994/1995 the USA provided $ 700 000 in
cash and $ 2 300 000 worth of equipment to the Tri-
bunal,83 whereas at the same time the USA share of
debt in the United Nations was 55%.84 This manner
of financing of the Tribunal by private donors and
‘intermeshing of NATO governments’ indicates the
influence which some countries might exercise on
the ICTY activities and the lack of independent re-
view of the whole system. 
Conclusion
At the end, it should be pointed out that the idea of
prosecuting individuals responsible under interna-
75. Michael P. Scharf, ‘The Politics Behind
U.S. Opposition to the International Crimi-
nal Court’, Vol. VI The Brown Journal of
World Affairs, Issue 1 (Winter/Spring 1999),
p. 97–104, at p. 99. 
76. Ibid. 
77. Garry Grey, The Milosevic Indictment: Le-
gal Document or Political Diatribe?, of 1 June
1999, <www.wsws.org/articles/1999/
jun1999/milo-j01.shtml>. 
78. Jianming Shen, ’A Politicized ICTY
Should Come to and End’, The Law Profes-
sor’s Network, <http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/
shen.htm>.
79. Tony Robson, Milosevic Trial: Hague Tri-
bunal Shows its Partisan Nature, <http://
www.wsws.org/articles/2001/oct2001/
milo-o15.shtml>.
80. See BBC News on-line debate of July
2001, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/
talking_point/1419834.stm>.
81. Garry Grey, The Milosevic Indictment: Le-
gal Document or Political Diatribe?, of 1 June
1999, <www.wsws.org/articles/1999/
jun1999/milo-j01.shtml>. 
82. Tony Robson, Milosevic Trial: Hague Tri-
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tional law is a noble idea which gives the hope that
no crimes will remain unpunished. The establish-
ment of the ad hoc tribunal(s) helped in speeding up
the process of adopting the Rome Statute on the
permanent International Criminal Court reflecting
the voluntary choice of the states to deal with the is-
sues of individual crimes under international law. Af-
ter all unsuccessful attempts which had been under-
taken in the past, the ICC creation can be considered
as a big success of the international community. At
the same time, the establishment of the ICTY
opened an era of different understanding of what the
law and fairness are in the current international and
national arenas. Although the idea of establishing an
international criminal court is relatively old, the as-
sumed legal capacity of the Security Council to pro-
ceed with the creation of an ad hoc tribunal, is rather
recent. In its core it means the application of puni-
tive means on individuals rather than on states
(which are the only subject and object of the regula-
tion by the UN Charter) for achievement of political
goals. This, however, involves on its part also the
questions of the implementation of basic require-
ments of human rights protection in general, includ-
ing the rights of the accused in particular. Whereas
the Tribunal can insist on respecting the procedural
safeguards of due process as established in both na-
tional and international systems, there is an obvious
departure from the past view on the meaning of ‘es-
tablished by law’ and independence and impartiality
of a tribunal which are the very basis of the fair trial
concept. This is result of the Tribunal’s ‘structural
shortfalls’ coming from the manner in which it had
been established, rather than of the shortcomings in
the ICTY Statute or the ICTY Rules of Procedure
and Evidence. Under these conditions, quite proba-
bly the Tribunal will not be able to fulfil its historical
task, and that is to bring to justice and to punish all
the responsible for crimes under international law
committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.
Nijmegen, december 2002
